Risk and Image Payments

Posted by Mark Brousseau

Vijay Balakrishnan, president of StratEx, LLC (www.stratexllc.blogspot.com) passes along the following article:

It occurs to me that payment security, like beauty, may rest in the eye of the beholder. Societal norms on beauty have ranged over the years from Raphaelesque abundance to Twiggy-like minimalism. With payments transformed in ever larger numbers from pieces of paper to electronic images, the debate du jour centers on the risk of image payments. Does the transformation of checks to images and data for onward transmission through an evolving electronic infrastructure introduce additional risk? The answer perhaps depends on one's perspective.

The proponents on either side have aligned themselves into sharply defined camps. There are those who attest that technology provides the ability to check for fraud at a scale never before possible, and that business processes need to step up to avail of new avenues. There are others who turn the argument on its head and assert that technology allows the propagation of fraud at the speed of light; the paper check, after all, was bound by the limitations of planes, trains, and automobiles.

Lending more uncertainty to the dialog is a regulatory black hole that allows many degrees of interpretive freedom. Check 21, which is widely touted as the legislative parent of the image revolution in U.S. check processing, is noticeably silent on image exchange. All Check 21 says is that a paper "substitute check" meeting certain requirements can be created from an image of a paper check, and that this new piece of paper has the same legal standing as the original item. It says nothing about the image itself, or its transmission within or between financial institutions. While this delights and provides opportunity to those in the legal profession, it does little to shore up the basic argument- is the new image infrastructure riskier than the paper based one it is replacing?

The central issue is not whether image payments are risky (all payments arguably are risky at some level), but whether they pose additional risk. Those in the no-additional-risk camp question whether every paper item is checked for signature and check stock viability, and whether every deposit is reviewed based on business rules. They assert that technology can automatically examine every item and deposit (or a subset thereof) using rule based filters, and identify those that need manual intervention. They further point out at this can be done on "Day Zero" at initial capture, instead of on "Day Two and Beyond" in the paper world. If anything, they claim, the automated image world is less risky than its paper predecessor.

"Not so fast," say the others. The lack of robust duplicate detection systems across payment channels (branches, ATMs, other remote capture locations), and between institutions make the electronic equivalent of check kiting a real threat. With access to the right software, images can be altered with greater ease than paper items. They also point out that this risk can emanate from within financial institutions, as opposed to "the other side of the firewall". While it is theoretically possible for technology to check all items, few institutions have this capability in place. The regulatory framework is playing catch-up to the reality of billions of image payments zapping their way across the nation (and indeed the world with the international remote capture of U.S. dollar deposits), making for a Jello-like foundation.

During the now distant past when the credit card world confronted similar issues, the card associations came up with rules of governance. They were also able to establish the interchange system, which shared revenue and risk between acquirers, processors, and issuers. Thus, their approach focused less on the presence or absence of risk, and more on a system that compensated entities in the chain for risk exposure. Interchange was established at a time when the power equation between banks and merchants was tilted heavily in favor of financial institutions. It is highly unlikely that an interchange system for image exchange will see light of day. This brings up another intriguing question- regardless of the outcome of the less versus more risk debate, will future years see risk adjusted transaction fees for image processing?

The challenge with questions of this nature early in the life cycle of disruptive technology adoption is that answers cannot be based on empirical information. Like changing perspectives on beauty, there are myriad opinions. If you have a take on this, let me know. Speculating on a brave new world in itself is relatively risk free. It will be a while before your opinion is borne out one way or the other!